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Appendix 2 




ABSTRACT. This paper sets out to explore how hermeneutics might offer an approach to 
describing the nature of developing understanding in mathematical activity. In discussing 
the relationship between mathematics and mathematical activity it shows how 
hermeneutical understanding provides an opportunity to avoid positivistic descriptions 
that draw a hard distinction between the process and content of learning mathematics. 




Early writers in hermeneutics (eg Dilthey), described a hard distinction between 
explanation as might be offered within the natural sciences and understanding (or more 
specifically an interpretation) as might be offered in the human sciences such as history 
(fig a). The former could be offered as a statement of fact whilst the latter could always 
be subject to personal interpretation. More recent writers (eg Ricoeur (1971, 1976), 
Habermas (1982)) have challenged this, bringing understanding and explanation into a 






This later view might be summarised by the following statements which might be seen as 
characterising the two arcs of the hermeneutic circle. 
 
1. Understanding to explanation. 
Statements about historical events may be forever subject to review  but in order to act it 
is necessary to suspend doubt and act as if our current reading is correct. Such a closure 
might be seen as complementing the phenomenologist's suspension of belief whilst 
thinking (see Schutz 1962).  
 
2. Explanation to understanding 
'Hard' statements about scientific phenomena are always viewed by individual humans in 
a particular context who make decisions about where these statements apply and choose 
where to use them. 
 
Mathematics, which is often characterised as a subject comprising 'hard' statements, only 
ever finds expression in human activity. It can thus be seen as a subject of hermeneutic 
understanding if the emphasis is placed on interpreting mathematical activity, which itself 
might embrace the generation of mathematical statements. However, the making of these 
statements might cause a change in our perception of the context in which we see them 
arising. Such circularity emphasises the individual relation of the learner to mathematics 
where the learner can only see mathematical phenomena from an individual perspective. 
Thus it might be suggested that the individual's view of mathematical 'content', as 
represented in the statements he makes, necessarily retains a residue from the 'process' 
through which it has been approached.  
 
Any notion of a correct universal meaning does not arise within hermeneutic 
understanding. The way in which an expression is seen and used is always in a state of 
flux, being modified as the life experience of the individual affects the contexts in which 
it is seen as being appropriate. In reporting on mathematical activity we may choose to 
make a statement about it but may not be able to claim that it is an 'exact' representation 
of the phenomena described. Expressions offered by an individual are necessarily 
approximations to that which he means, speaking from the perspective of his individual 
life context. Habermas (1982) suggests that the gap between such an expression and what 
is meant by it can only be closed by interpretation. It is this very tension between 
statements and the meaning assigned to them that locates the hermeneutic circle. This 
moves away from notions of understanding developing in the mind, as might be offered 
by disciples of Piaget but, like Walkerdine (1989), focuses more on understanding arising 
in the social use of linguistic (or mathematical) forms in signifying phenomena. The issue 
being not so much arriving at concepts in a world that is knowable but rather converging 
to conventional usage of linguistic expressions.  
 
As an example, I recently witnessed a lesson where eight year olds were working on the 
program "Reflect" (SMILE) as part of some work on "symmetry". This program allows 
the children to generate symmetrical shapes.  The children were quite able to offer 
statements on the subject: 
 
"If it goes up there, the other side goes up the other way" 
"It's the same both sides, like it's cut in half" 
"That line up the middle is like the line of symmetry" 
"It's straight in that it divides" 
 
Here it seems the children are not so much arriving at the 'concept' of 'symmetry' but 
rather offering a succession of statements that might be  seen as being under the umbrella 
of this label. Children of this age seemed unable to offer anything approaching a formal 
definition. By seeing the commonness in the collection of statements the student might 
move towards more abstract notions of 'symmetry' and recognise the appropriateness of 
the term in other situations. But whatever this commonness might be it is always subject 
to modification as the set of experiences seen to be embracing it increases. A formal 
statement thus can only ever be seen as a report on the current view. However 'fact-like' a 
statement might appear it is always subject to humans deciding where and when to use it. 
Some might assume their own understanding of such a term is shared with others but this 
might simply mean that they are sufficiently close in their usage of it for them to be able 
to say they agree on its meaning. Any  permanence supposed here is perhaps an illusion. 
Surely, it is no more than a way of describing that allows the individual to cope for the 
time being, until the linguistic categories employed become inadequate in describing the 
situation in which he perceives himself to be acting.  
  
Mathematical activity 
The same might be said of expressions generated in mathematical activity. Even though 
people may believe there are mathematical expressions that mean the same to all people, 
each individual takes that expression and places it in the context of their experience, 
cultural perspective and current intentions. Expressions are used  in a particular way 
which may indicate the intended meaning. For example, in an infants class I witnessed a 
six year old child engaged in a partitioning exercise using counters. He wrote down the 
equation  2+1+1+1=5. Perhaps it was the first time he had ever written this particular 
expression. I feel his perception of it was rather different to my own since we were 
bringing different things to it. The contexts in which we see such statements being used 
and thus our understanding of them necessarily develop as our experience grows. Such an 
expression is simply a label we attach to a certain class of situations we recognise in our 
individual life context.   
 
The statements arising out of mathematical activities may not always be so precise as the 
equation arrived at by this child. For example, problem solving or investigational tasks  
often lead to the generation of many sorts of statements (eg Evans and Billington (1987), 
Mason, Burton and Stacey (1982). Such activities, which might be characterised by the 
teacher being less prescriptive in terms of requiring particular methods and answers, 
permit the students to take a more general overview of the activity in which they are 
engaged.  
 
Elsewhere (Brown 1990), I have described a lesson with a class of ten year olds in these 
terms. Here the children were exploring the areas of the 'lawn' and 'path' in 'gardens' 
comprising a rectangular lawn surrounded by a path. Initially, the children made models 
of the gardens out of plastic squares and counted the squares to find the appropriate areas 
each time. The statements about 'gardens' referred to the plastic models. However, in due 
course the construction of the plastic models became cumbersome and the children 
readily transferred their work on to squared paper which permitted a more efficient way 
of producing representations of 'gardens'. For a while this proved successful but as bigger 
drawings were produced the limitations of the paper became evident. The possibility of 
tabulating the areas then seemed an appropriate way of gathering together the data that 
had been generated. In doing this, number patterns were suggested which allowed new 
data to be produced without the need for making or drawing new models. As more tables, 
were generated, more general statements could be made about them. For some children 
these statements were translated to a shorthand in the form of a more conventional 
algebraic symbolisation. During this work verbal and written statements from the 
children included: 
 
"You add the top to the bottom and then add on the two sides" 
"The area of the path goes up in twos" 
"The path is always bigger than the lawn" 
"Area of Path = MxN-M-2xN-2" 
 
Whilst some of these statements may lack the precision of formal mathematical 
statements they suggest real attempts by the children to represent the mathematical 
phenomena they are dealing with. 
 
Mason (1989a) proposes a model which seems useful in describing such activity. This 
comprises a helix where the experience of a mathematical situation is seen as passing 
repeatedly through the "getting a sense of", the "manipulating of" and the "articulating 
of" the problem.  This has much in common with the notion of the 'Hermeneutic Circle' 
which might be used here to describe the tension between interpreting a problem and 
making statements in respect of it, which in turn influence subsequent interpretations. 
Mason himself suggests "the process of abstracting in mathematics lies in the momentary 
movement from articulating to manipulating. Articulation of a seeing of generality, first 
in words or pictures, and then increasingly tight and economically succinct expressions, 
using symbols and perhaps diagrams, is a pinnacle of achievement, often achieved only 
after a great struggle. It becomes a mere foothill as it becomes a staging post for further 
work with the expression as a manipulable object". I take this to mean that the student, in 
gaining understanding, moves between emphases; e.g. from following through a chain of 
thought to placing it in to some context, or from talking about some situation to declaring 
an algebraic pattern, or from proposing a formula to checking it out with an example. In 
working on a problem one may become engrossed in the procedures and restrictions but 
after a while see a pattern; moving from work with particular cases to a recognition of the 
general. Thus the task of understanding might be seen as a mixture grasping relations 
internal to the mathematics and of seeing the problems in some context. 
 
 
Assessing mathematical activity 
With such a view of mathematical understanding there seems to be a need to develop an 
appropriate way of talking about mathematical achievement. Most assessments seem to 
be concerned with the production of correct mathematical statements as evidence of 
broader mathematical understanding. An alternative to this suggested by Mason (1989b) 
places emphasis on the 'story' told about the event of a mathematical activity. Such a 
story might be no more than the set of statements offered by the children under the label 
of 'symmetry'. Here assessment is not so much based on the proportion of correct 
statements but rather, on the quality of understanding demonstrated in giving an account 
of the activity. Thus the assessment might be more like one normally associated with a 
piece of writing.  
 
This suggests a possible reorientation of the teaching relation. Whilst the teacher may 
have selected the work she can ask the student to describe it in his own terms and then 
enter into a dialogue. This enables the student to articulate aspects of his thinking which 
may serve to help him clarify this. It also enables the teacher to gain some insight into the 
student's view and the language he uses. The resulting dialogue might be seen as an 
attempt to communicate in a shared language. However, the teacher might see part of her 
task as guiding the student towards conventional usage of certain expressions. 
 
 
In conclusion, the 'content' of the mathematical activity might be seen as  the outcome of 
the 'process' as described by the individual learner. Whilst modifying notions of 
mathematics which underlie syllabi constructed from a content-oriented point of view, 
traditional mathematical content still has a home here. However, the syllabus cannot be 
seen as remaining intact as the student progresses through it since the content of such a 
syllabus is flavoured by the activities that give rise to it. A residue remains of the 
experience in any identification of content covered which will be present in statements 
made by the student. Assessing the student's understanding of his mathematical work 
through the statements he makes in respect of it necessarily requires personal 
interpretation from his teachers in deciding how these statements signify the student's 
understanding. This does not rely solely on the student's production of correct 
mathematical statements. Commentary on the sense the student's make of the experience 







Billington, J and Evans, P.: (1987), 'Levels of knowing 2 'the handshake'' in Mathematics 
Teaching, September. 
 
Brown, T.: (1990) 'Active Learning in Investigational Tasks' in Mathematics Teaching, 
December. 
 
Dilthey, W.: 1900, 'The Development of Hermeneutics', Selected Writings, edited and 
translated by H.P.Rickman, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
 
Habermas, J.: 1978,  Knowledge and Human Interest  Heinemann, chap.8. 
 
Mason, J.: 1989a, 'Mathematical Abstraction as a Delicate Shift in Attention', For the 
Learning of Mathematics, Montreal, vol.9, pp.2-8. 
 
Mason, J.: 1989b, 'Teaching (Pupils to Make Sense) and Assessing (the Sense They 
Make)', in Ernest,P. (Ed) Mathematics Teaching: the State of the Art, Falmer Press, 
Lewes, E. Sussex. 
 
Mason,J,  Burton, L, and Stacey, K.: 1982, Thinking Mathematically, Addison Wesley, 
London. 
 
Ricoeur, P.: 1971, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 
chap.5. 
 
Ricoeur, P.: 1976, Interpretation Theory, Texas Christian University Press. 
 
Schutz, A.: 1962, The Problem of Social Reality, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p.229. 
 SMILE  'Reflect' from the Microsmile package '11 More', SMILE, London. 
 




Centre for Mathematics Education 
Manchester Polytechnic 
Didsbury 
Manchester 
 
